Introduction
The role of political socialization in explaining disengagement from specific modes of activism beyond voting remains largely unexplored, limited to date by available data and methods. While most previous studies have tended to propose explanations for disengagement linked to specific repertoires of political action, we propose a unified theory based on the contexts of socialization of subsequent generations. We test this theory using a new dataset of collated waves of the British Social Attitudes (BSAS 1 ) survey and by applying age-period-cohort (APC) models for repeated crosssectional data with a categorised generation variable as well as generalized additive models (GAMs) with year of birth as a continuous variable to identify generational effects through two different methods and add robustness to our results. We show that generational effects underlie the participatory decline across repertoires. Consistent with our theoretical expectations, the results show that the generation that came of political age during the 1980s -'Thatcher's Children' -is less politically involved than the generation that came of age in the rather more politicized 1960s-70s -'Wilson/Callaghan's Children' -and this finding holds across different repertoires of political action. Moreover, the Millennial generation -'Blair's Babies' -emerges as the least engaged of all. We reflect on these results in the conclusion and highlight the concerning implications of falling levels of activism for advanced democracies.
1 The British Social Attitudes Survey series began in 1983. It is based on an annual random probability, face-to-face survey of approximately 3,000 Britons. The series is designed to act as a counterpart to other large-scale government surveys such as the Labour Force Survey or the General Lifestyle Survey, which provide data on behavioural actions and tangible 'facts'. It has been conducted every year since 1983, except in 1988 and 1992.
Participation and democracy
Citizen participation lies at the heart of a healthy democracy (Barber, 1984 ) and yet there have been growing concerns about political disengagement in advanced democracies (Pharr and Putnam, 2000 , Gray and Caul, 2000 , Pattie and Johnston, 2001 , Hay, 2007 , Van Biezen et al., 2012 . This decline in participation is said to leave democracy 'hollowed out' (Mair, 2006) . Falling turnout levels are particularly alarming since they call into question the representative claims of democratic government (Pattie et al., 2004 , Pattie et al., 2003 .
Contrary to this negative picture, scholars studying unconventional or protest participation tend to present a more positive picture. These scholars argue that since the post-war period there has been a growth in engagement in public demonstrations and other modes of protest activism, such as signing petitions, boycotting products or companies, joining new social movement organizations, etc. (Inglehart, 1977 , Inglehart and Welzel, 2005 , Inglehart, 1990 , Mayer, 2010 , Marsh et al., 2007 , Norris, 2002 , Norris, 1999 . In the words of key authors, advanced democracies have now become 'social movement societies ' (Meyer and Tarrow, 1998) marked by the 'normalization of protest ' (Van Aelst and Walgrave, 2001 ).
Given these considerations, any study of political engagement in advanced democracies must analyse participation in both conventional and unconventional political actions. By shedding light on the variation that underlies these long-term trends in political participation it is possible to assess the state of democracy in advanced societies (Hay, 2007 , Stoker, 2006 . In order to examine the question of the extent of inequalities in political participation and underlying trends of political disengagement we must compare different political generations and use methods that aim to distinguish those differences due to age, time period and generational cohorts.
Inter-generational change and changing patterns of participation
Social change occurs through generational replacement and therefore the analysis of generational patterns of participation can allow us to establish the sources of any long-term trends. This is because as older generations die out, they are replaced by new generations exhibiting new patterns of behaviour. Moreover, the years of youth are "impressionable" so that the characteristics of an epoch tend to mould their imprint on those "coming of age" in that period. While this idea was first famously articulated by Mannheim (1928) , research on age-period-cohort effects has since repeatedly shown that generations can differ markedly in their values and political behaviours (Tilley, 2001 , Tilley, 2002 , Grasso, 2014 , Neundorf and Niemi, 2014 , Tilley and Evans, 2014 , Grasso, 2016 , Grasso et al., 2017 .
Franklin (2004) notably examined the role of cohort effects in explaining turnout decline in Western Europe. This research showed that turnout decline results from younger generations participating at lower rates than older generations.
However, the explanations offered by Franklin focused on factors strictly related to elections and turnout such as the closeness of the race. As such, there was no discussion in this seminal study of how political socialization might also explain disengagement from unconventional alongside conventional activism. To address this important gap in the literature, in this paper we show that similar generational effects underlie participatory decline in both repertoires. While previous studies have tended to propose explanations for disengagement linked to specific repertoires of political action, we propose a unified theory which pertains to both conventional and unconventional domains based on the different political contexts of socialization.
We argue that politicization and the contestation of ideas are key elements determining the extent to which citizens are motivated to engage in politics and to participate politically (Hay, 2004) . The political contexts in which different political generations have come of age in Britain are markedly different in terms of the extent of political contestation of key ideas (Grasso et al. 2017) . (Jennings, 1987) . In contrast, the late 1970s brought with them economic crisis and the rise of New Right politics. The 1980s were marked by a political shift towards neoliberal market economies in many Western democracies. The rise of the New Right most clearly signalled a rightward shift in opinion in the United States, United
Kingdom and other Anglo-American democracies in the 1980s (Le Grande and Bartlett, 1993, Himmelstein, 1990) . 'Thatcher's Children' -socialised during the 1980s and early 1990s -thus came of age in an era which emphasized individualism and self-reliance over collective pursuits such as political participation for social change which had been so central previously. This political epoch was marked by a shift away from collective wage bargaining and corporatist governance towards private ownership and control of many previously publicly-owned enterprises and the decline in union membership. Individuals, rather than collectives, came to be seen as the key units of society.
Soon, other advanced democracies also followed with neoliberal reforms as social democratic parties distanced themselves from socialist ideals and moved towards the centre of the ideological spectrum across Europe (Mair, 2006) . While ideological contestation still existed in this phase of 'normative neoliberalism' (Hay, 2004 ) where Thatcher's Children were coming of age (Grasso et al., 2017) , a consensus was increasingly emerging over the contemporary model of market-based economics married to limited social protections. This 'normalized neoliberalism' phase (Hay, 2004) emerged in the aftermath of the Cold War, as even leftist political opponents from social democratic parties previously favouring state ownership and nationalization of major industries as well as much wider universalized social welfare systems had come to internalize its market precepts as 'the rules of the game' (Grasso et al., 2017) . As such, 'Blair's Babies' -the generation socialised in the years of New Labour -grew up in an epoch marked by the depoliticisation of public debate in the wake of "TINA" ('there is no alternative' -to the market) and the acceptance of neoliberal ideology by the Labour Party. Moreover, this process had led to the rise of technocratic imperatives and the suggestion that questions of politics have now become simply questions of good governmental management, devoid of normative meaning (Mair, 2006) . In this context, politicians tend increasingly to portray their decisions as above contestation in an effort to evoke consensus (Hay, 2007) . In the process they avoid political arguments in favour of technocratic reason, often appealing to external economic constraints that they are powerless to shape in the process. This avoids the disagreement that has traditionally been at the heart of politics and presents elite decision-making as void of ideology (Mair, 2006) . Thus depoliticisation can be seen as a major factor alienating the public, and particularly younger generations coming of age in this context, from politics in presenting the impression that there is no normative underpinning to elite decision-making and that all the political questions have already been 'solved' (Hay, 2007) .
In this paper we build on these insights and analyse whether those that came Scholars have tended to argue for a decline of conventional participation. On the other hand, they have argued for a rise in protest activism such as demonstrating, petition-signing and boycotting, seen also as replacing conventional activism. We hypothesise that we should see similar generational patterns across modes of political action. We thus challenge the conventional substitution thesis, since we expect the same underlying processes of depoliticisation to be at play across all activities. While Grasso (2016) provided some evidence using European survey data, here we focus on the specifics of the British context and draw on data that covers a greater number of important control variables from the BSAS as newly collated in a harmonized repeated cross-sectional dataset (Jennings et al., 2015) , to add empirical breadth to this theorizing. While previous studies hypothesized that younger generations coming of age since the 1960-70s will have a greater propensity to engage in unconventional activities, following the political generations account we hypothesize that:
H0 Generational patterns for conventional and unconventional forms of political participation will be similar (contrary to the substitution thesis) H1 Thatcher's Children are less likely than previous generations to engage in all political activities H2 Blair's Babies are less likely than Thatcher's Children to engage in all political activities
In the remainder of the paper, we first outline influential theories of political engagement. After this theoretical section, we discuss the data and methods employed, followed by presentation of results. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our findings. Brady (1999: 739) notes how participation has four key characteristics: action, citizens, politics and influence. One set of activities focuses around voting, elections and parties and is normally understood as 'conventional'; this has been traditionally distinguished from 'unconventional' acts or protest activism such as demonstrating, signing a petition, joining a boycott etc. (Barnes and Kaase, 1979 , Inglehart, 1977 , Inglehart and Welzel, 2005 , Inglehart, 1990 , Dalton, 2008 . In addition to voting and campaign activities, conventional participation includes different types of community-based actions, contacting activities (elected legislators, officials, the media etc.) and working with others to address issues/solve problems (Verba and Nie, 1972) . Unconventional activities encompass more 'low risk' forms of protest such as signing a petition or joining a boycott or attending demonstrations to more costly and 'high risk' forms of actions such as occupations, illegal protests, and even violence.
Determinants of political engagement
Several key theories from political science, political sociology and social movement studies allow us to draw out the key individual level determinants of participation which might help to explain generational inequalities in political action.
In other words, while 'net' generational differences show differences in socialisation, there are different potential narratives as to what lies behind them. In this way, political socialisation is an additional factor that needs to be taken into account in analyses of political participation and not one that is contained in any of the below categories. Political generations are distinguished through their socialisation experiences in a particular political and historical contexts as famously articulated by Mannheim (1928) . Much research has shown that generations coming of age in specific periods tend to exhibit characteristics that differentiate them from each other in both values and political behaviours (Tilley, 2001 , Tilley, 2002 , Grasso, 2011 , Bartels and Jackman, 2014 , Grasso, 2014 , Neundorf and Niemi, 2014 , Tilley and Evans, 2014 . In Britain, 'Thatcher's Children' (Heath and Park, 1997, Russell et al., 1992) , the generation that came of age during Thatcher's and Major's time in office (between 1979 and 1997) , has been the object of a number of studies.
However, other than socialization, there are other potentially confounding influences distinguishing generations that could explain variation in differing rates of participation. A number of factors have been identified as important in studies of political participation. A first group of factors explaining political participation with respect to various socio-demographic characteristics have been highlighted primarily in the biographical availability model (McAdam 1986) . It is important to take sociodemographic factors into account when testing for socialization effects since younger individuals tend to be more likely to be in education, unmarried and free from obligations of careers and families and thus more 'biographically available' to participate. Moreover, young people will tend to be less invested in their careers and thus have more time and the mental energy to get involved in and commit to politics; they are less likely to have entered marriage 2 and to have children: both things which decrease free time and the willingness to take risks (Wiltfang and McAdam, 1991) .
This literature also suggests that people in full-time employment will be less likely to participate (McCarthy and Zald, 1973, McAdam, 1986) . However, McAdam (1986) and Nepstad and Smith (1999) demonstrated that people in full-time (inflexible) employment were more likely to participate; this has also been found to vary by commitment (Saunders et al., 2012) .
The civic voluntarism model also highlights socio-demographic variables, and particularly education and class, as very important given the argument that people who are better off and more resource-rich, more middle class, better educated, with higher incomes, are more likely to participate , Parry et al., 1992 . However, the civic voluntarism model moves beyond this and conceptualizes resources widely, including time . It also links resources to political engagement at the psychological level (Schussman and Soule, 2005) . Feelings of involvement with the political system and of mobilization, normally through organizational membership, are emphasized since individuals must be elicited in their participation . And indeed, research has shown the importance of campaigning by political parties for mobilization (Pattie et al., 1995 , Whiteley et al., 1994 , Seyd and Whiteley, 1992 or asking people to protest (Schussman and Soule, 2005) . Other than political interest, consumption of political information such as newspaper readership matters . Ideology is also seen as important as more liberal individuals are normally seen as more likely to engage in political activities aimed at challenging the status quo (Verba et al., 1997 , Dalton, 2008 , Hirsch, 1990 , Schussman and Soule, 2005 .
Organizational membership and embeddedness in social networks facilitating the recruitment to political action (McAdam, 1986 , Passy, 2001 , Passy and Giugni, 2001 ) are also emphasised by the structural availability model. Since organizations forge ties between people, they multiply the possibilities that individuals will be mobilized to action -through the flow of information, through persuasion etc.
( McAdam and Paulsen, 1993 , McAdam, 1986 , Paulsen, 1991 , Oberschall, 1973 .
Another way in which organizations can promote participation is by developing civic skills . Building on insights from the original rational choice model, Whiteley and Seyd's general incentives model (Whiteley et al., 1994 , Whiteley and Seyd, 1996 , Seyd and Whiteley, 1992 , Whiteley and Seyd, 1998 combines rational choice and social psychological models. They emphasise the role of expressive incentives (e.g. group attachment) as well as system benefits (e.g. a sense of duty) and collective benefits for participation. The social capital model also sees organizational memberships as important and emphasizes trust (Putnam, 1993) ; the trust that is developed through voluntary activities spills over into other spheres of social, political and economic life, leading to more well-governed, affluent and politically engaged citizenries (Putnam, 1993 , Whiteley, 2000 , Hall, 1999 .
The cognitive mobilization model in particular emphasises the role of dissatisfaction and grievances, in line with the social psychological model (Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2013) and suggests that individuals with higher levels of education, political interest and political information will be more likely to become dissatisfied with political outcomes and inclined to protest (Dalton, 2008 , Skocpol, 1979 , Norris, 1999 . As such grievances could also play an important role in explaining participation. Indeed, one of the oldest models of participation, developed with reference to revolutions, is the perceived equity-fairness or relative deprivation model employed by social historians (Hobsbawm, 1962 , Skocpol, 1979 and social scientists in various forms such as the J-form and frustration-aggression hypotheses and strain or breakdown theories (Davies, 1962 , Runciman, 1966 , Gurr, 1970 . Here it is particularly emphasised that what drives individuals to engage in political activism is a sense of injustice, particularly in relation to some reference group.
Data and methods
In order to analyse age-period-cohort effects on political engagement and explain generational differences this paper uses a publicly available collation of the BSAS datasets (see Jennings et al., 2015) . The repeated cross-sectional data is necessary to disentangle age-period-cohort effects and as such we could not utilize data spanning shorter periods that include a larger battery of activities such as the Citizen's Audit (Pattie et al., 2004 , Pattie et al., 2003 . The analysis of political activism is based on eight indicators included in the survey between 1983-2012, covering three of the dimensions identified by seminal studies (Pattie et al., 1995 , Pattie et al., 2004 , Pattie et al., 2003 , Parry et al., 1992 : contacting activities, group activities, and protest activities. These variables will measure both traditional and newer (e.g. electronic or internet-based) forms of political activity.
potentially confounding influences of age and period effects. Age effects suggest that participation trajectories change with social ageing and indeed research has found that older people are more likely than younger people to be involved in conventional activities whereas younger people are more likely to engage in protest activism (Dalton, 2008) . Moreover, certain historical moments -or periods -are understood to stimulate more general participation. To identify generation effects we need to control for both age and period, or year of survey, in our models. However, given the age-period-cohort 'identification problem' 4 we need to apply certain restrictions. A rich statistical literature has emerged over the years to 'solve' the 'identification problem'. While there are strictly no statistical solutions to this problem, the use of theoretically informed choices can allow simplifying assumptions to estimate the effects of interest (Tilley 2002) .
In this paper, we categorise generations based on the historical period of their formative years. Moreover, we identify the models differently through generalized additive models (GAMs) where we use year of birth as a continuous variable and use these to plot the identified, smoothed cohort effect. In this way, the GAMs add robustness to the results presented in the paper since they are identified differently from the other models. Here we use year of birth estimated as smoothly changing whereas in the APC models we use the theoretically informed categorization of generations based on the distinct historical periods of their formative years.
Moreover, we use the results from the age-period-cohort models to conduct postestimation Wald tests for intergenerational differences.
Given our interest in generational effects, year of birth is the main independent variable. This ranges from 1910 to 1990 in our survey data. The key period of socialization will largely depend on the mechanism hypothesized (Inglehart 1990 (Inglehart , 1977 Bartels and Jackman 2014) . Given our hypotheses rely on political awareness we would expect that socialization should occur during the mid-teens to the mid-to late 20s (Jennings and Niemi, 1974) . We assign individuals to different political generations based on the historical phase in which they spent the majority of their formative years (see Grasso et al. 2017 ). As such, we define Thatcher's Children as those born between 1959 and 1976 and coming of age in the protracted period of Conservative rule between 1979 and 1996. This generation and the others analysed in this study are presented in Table 1 .
<TABLES 1 & 2>
This method of categorizing generations has the advantage that it places emphasis on the historical period of a generation's socialization. The years of birth of the political generations are then derived from this information. We include the categorized political generations variable in the age-period-cohort models in order to
(1) cross-check the robustness of the results from the GAMs and (2) use Wald tests to test for cohort differences. In the GAMs we use the continuous year of birth variable to derive the smoothed cohort effects which means the models in the GAMs are identified differently to those from the regression models. Other than year of birth/cohort we also control for age and period to identify the age-period-cohort models. Age is a three-level factor coded: (1) under 34 years; (2) 35-59 year; (3) over 60 years. 6 We also control for year of survey as a linear term since the literature on participation extensively argues that we are witnessing a decline in conventional political participation on the one hand and a rise in unconventional participation on the other (see Hay 2007 , Norris 2002 , Inglehart and Welzel 2005 .
Based on our earlier discussion of models of political participation we control for a number of salient factors identified in the literature that might contribute to observed generational differences in rates of participation. By controlling for age and period as well as these effects we can then analyse 'net' generational differences in participation -in other words, the residual, or 'pure' generational effect. In order to do this we therefore operationalize the insights from the theories of political engagement discussed above. We control for gender, employment status (being unemployed), student status, marital status and having children 7 . We also include a control for ethnic group since minorities have also traditionally been a relatively deprived group in British society (Clarke 2004: 240) . Moreover, we include income, social class (manual occupation) 8 , and education level, private education and home ownership for resources. For organizational membership we include an indicator for union/staff association membership. We also include party attachment (whether 6 The first age group is used as the reference category in the models. 7 The variable for children in the household was missing between 1993 and 2001 so instead we include a dummy for three or more individuals in the household 8 The 'Registrar-General's Social Classes' were introduced in 1913 and were renamed in 1990 as 'Social Class based on Occupation'. Note that a few individuals will change social class over time because of changes in the classification of occupations. In 1981 the 1980 Classification was used, in 1991 it was the 1990 Standard Occupational Classification (SOC90) and in 2001 this was replaced by SOC2000.
individuals identify with a party or not), newspaper readership, and ideology in the form of an item measuring left-right values ("Government should redistribute from the better off to the less well off") and another for libertarian-authoritarian values ("Schools should teach children to obey authority"). Additionally, for grievances for participation we use the item "Management will always try and get the better of employees" to capture this dimension. Moreover, we include institutional trust ("How much do you trust British governments of any party to put the needs of the country first."). We do not have an indicator of social trust available. Finally, we noted how the relative deprivation model emphasizes a sense of injustice, particularly in relation to some reference group, as spurring people to action and as such we include an item picking up on this dimension ("There is one law for the rich and one for the poor.").
Descriptive statistics for all the variables are presented in Table 2 .
<TABLE 3> Results
First we describe levels of participation by political generation from Table 3 . Note that in these descriptive statistics, generation effects are not isolated from the confounding influences of age and period and therefore differences in the fully identified age-period-cohort models may turn out to be much larger -or smaller. As shown on Table 3 coming of age in the 1960s and 70s is the most participatory across the board, at least according to these initial descriptive trends. We now turn to see whether these initial descriptive results are confirmed in the APC models identified in two different ways:
first through the GAMs with the continuous year of birth variable, and then in the APC models with the categorized generation variable.
<FIGURES 1-4>
First we examine the results from the generalized additive models (GAMs). In particular, we examine the plots of the smoothed cohort effect, as presented in Blair's Babies, they are even less participatory than the Post-WWII generation with respect to contacting activities (Figure 1) . Moreover, it looks as though group activism ( Figure 2 ) also records low levels of involvement amongst the youngest generations. It is particularly telling that even with protest (Figure 3) , which is widely argued to be the activity of choice for younger generations, we see a downward sloping trend. This is replicated for the overall activism measure (Figure 4 ).
<TABLE 4-5>
The terms for the generation effects in the age-period-cohort logistic regression models in Table 4 confirm the results from the GAMs very clearly. Across models and across forms of engagement, Thatcher's Children generation and the Millennial Blair Babies are less participatory than 1960s and 70s Wilson/Callaghan's Generation even in those modes of participation -such as protest activism -that are meant to be much more commonly practiced amongst the younger generations (Inglehart 1990) . Across the models, and for the various types of participation, cohort differences generally remain robust to the inclusion of the various control and explanatory variables in the models -with the exception of protest activism, further discussed below-suggesting that the political context at the time of socialization was a very important influence in itself, and cannot generally be reduced to mediating factors such as the development of strong feelings of party attachment or the greater tendency to join associations. In order to make sense of where the greatest reductions in magnitude come from, we ran a series of stepwise models between the APC model and the full model (not shown here but available from the authors). These models showed that for contacting, the greatest reductions in the cohort coefficients for
Thatcher's Children and Blair's Babies were achieved in the civic voluntarism model, even more than for the full model. This suggests that lower levels of political commitment (ideological attachments, newspaper readership), as well as party attachment and associational memberships/mobilisation, have an important role to play in explaining these generational differences. If individuals are not ideologically committed nor mobilized to political action through parties or other associations it is unlikely that they will engage in contacting acts.
Moving on to the results for group activity, as with contacting, the civic voluntarism model did particularly well in terms of contributing to the explanation for why Thatcher's Children and Blair's Babies are less politically active than
Wilson/Callaghan's Children. Once again, political engagement (ideological commitment, newspaper readership), as well as party attachment and mobilisation variables in particular, appear important for explaining generational differences:
younger generations have weaker left-wing beliefs and are less likely to be mobilised (Grasso et al. 2017 ). As such, it is not surprising that they are less likely to form formal and informal groups struggling for political causes relative to the more politicised Wilson/Callaghan's Children.
Moving onto the results for protest activism, those models that include associational memberships or party attachment fully explain the lower protest proclivities of Thatcher's Children relative to Wilson/Callaghan's Children, as the generational coefficient ceases to be statistically significant. The civic voluntarism model also stands out as accounting for the greatest reduction in the generational effect for Blair's Babies, suggesting once again that leftist political beliefs, mobilisation and party attachment are the key variables linking socialisation in
Britain to decreased political activism amongst these younger generations. In addition, both the cognitive mobilization grievances and relative deprivation injustice variables fare better than they did for the previous two forms of participation.
For overall activism, we also found the civic voluntarism model variables tended to explain away a greater proportion of the generational differences. Once again, the political engagement (ideological commitment), party attachment and mobilization variables look like they hold the most promise for providing part of the explanation for why Thatcher's Children and Blair's Babies are less participatory than Wilson/Callaghan's Children. They are less progressive ideologically, and less likely to hold strong political beliefs, they are more atomised and isolated and less likely to feel attached to parties and join associations. As such they are less likely to have both the mental and structural resources to get involved in political activism Finally, to conclude our analysis, Table 5 presents the results of Wald Tests checking for coefficient differences between the dummy variables included in the models (whereas in the models we can only test for differences with respect to the reference category). Blair's Babies are even less participatory than Thatcher's Children across modes of participation with the exception of group activity. Results presented in Table 5 also show that the Post-WWII Generation is more participatory than both Thatcher's Children and Blair's Babies in both contacting and group activities, and also overall in the case of the latter. These results clearly confirm both H1 and H2. The youngest Blair's Babies are even less involved in contacting activities than the Pre-WWII Generation.
Conclusions
We argue that politicization and the contestation of ideas are key elements determining the extent to which citizens are motivated to engage in politics (Hay, 2004 ). The political contexts in which the studied generations came of age are markedly different in terms of the political contestation of key ideas. The 1960s and 70s Wilson/Callaghan generation came to be known as 'the protest generation' (Jennings, 1987) in many countries across the world, including in Europe. In contrast, while ideological contestation still existed in this phase of 'normative neoliberalism', a consensus was increasingly emerging over the contemporary model of marketbased economics married to limited social protections (Mair, 2006) . This 'normalized neoliberalism' phase emerged in the aftermath of the Cold War, as even leftist political opponents came to accept it (Grasso et al., 2017) . On this basis, we theorized that while less active than the 'protest generation' of Wilson/Callaghan's Children (coming of age during the 1960s and 70s), the 1980s Thatcher's Children Generation may still be more participatory than Blair's Babies or the Millennials, as depoliticisation peaked during the formative years of the latter generation. We tested this theory by using a new dataset of collated waves of the BSAS and showed that the generation that came of political age during Thatcher's heyday in the 1980s was much less politically involved than prior generations across different repertoires;
Blair's Babies generation emerged as the least engaged of all.
More broadly, our results show that we should be very concerned about declining levels of democratic participation in advanced democracies (Putnam, 2000 , Stoker, 2006 , Hay, 2007 , Grasso, 2014 . Even for protest activism, which is widely identified as the political repertoire of choice for younger generations in the theoretical literature, the increasing generational trend was halted and put into reverse. Against the expectations of prominent theories, inter-generational replacement is thus likely to lead to less, not more, participant publics in the future (Grasso 2016) . The declining trend in civic engagement is not rescued through rising unconventional participation Welzel, 2005, Norris, 2002) . Based on these results, inter-generational replacement would lead to a deeper 'Democratic Deficit' (Norris, 2011) rather than a 'Democratic Phoenix' (Norris, 2002) . While patterns of turnout among younger generations in the 2017 British General Election might have shown some signs of recovery, it is far too early to conclude whether this marks a lasting change or a temporary deviation from the long-term trajectory.
Overall, our results show that political activism is likely to continue to fall in the future unless a new politicized generation emerges. The generation coming of age now in this age of populism, political division, identity politics, nationalism and social media may well be distinct (or not) from the generations that came before it.
How these trends unfold will be enlightening, and only time will tell whether fallout from the economic crisis and the increasing fragmentation of party systems in advanced democracies will alter these trajectories. Social fragmentation and the decline of political loyalties may give rise to an era of concerted 'identity' politics in which personal action may displace collective action (Bennett, 2013) .
Moreover, this research has shown that the civic voluntarism model is particularly useful for explaining generational differences in participation. It appears that ideological commitment, party attachment and mobilization, in addition to the socialization experiences in a given historical context, contribute to explaining the lower engagement levels of the youngest generations. Most importantly, this paper has shown that the "formative experiences" of new generations can affect the political behaviour trajectories and patterns of activism of entire nations. Our results, for both conventional and unconventional participation, raise fresh concerns about declining political involvement in advanced democracies. 1910-1924 1925-1944 1945-1958 1959-1976 1977-1990 Total N (%) 
